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Existing Democracy 
Ted A. Smith 
I ENGAGE TWO CONVERSATIONS: ONE ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BE-
tween history and ethics, and another about the relationship of Christianity 
and democracy in the United States. In the first half of the essay I suggest two 
shifts in the ways ethicists engage history. I argue that ethicists should be con-
cerned not only with ideas, but also with lived religion. I then propose "escha-
tological memory" as a genre for using historical studies for normative work. I 
develop it through contrast with Maclntyre's notion of tradition and through 
conversation with Benjamin's philosophy of history. In the second half of the 
paper I offer a long exemplum, an eschatological memory of the equality 
promised by Oberlin College. I recall the suppressed memory of a lynching, a 
memory that reveals the antinomies of equality and gives rise to a politics of 
piecemeal reform in the light of eschatological hope. 
In this essay I consider two contested relationships: between historical stud-ies and ethics, and between Christianity and democracy in the United States. For the sake of clarity I privilege one of these conversations, and I 
take up questions about history and ethics more directly. But questions of de-
mocracy and Christianity are always also present, and often on the surface. I 
trust interested readers to look for them. I consider these questions using two 
different modes of discourse: showing and telling. The essay begins with some 
telling, a quick sketch of an argument calling for Christian ethicists to tell histo-
ries as eschatological memories of lived religion. But the bulk of the essay en-
gages in showing. I remember the suppressed story of a lynching at Oberlin, a 
story of ferocious violence around the establishment of the nation's first college 
deliberately to integrate its classrooms with both men and women and blacks 
and whites. The story shows some of the antinomies of equality as it actually ex-
ists in the United States. I work from the story to suggest a politics of piecemeal 
repair that looks to a horizon of Christian hope. I mean this whole second half 
to be a showing, an exemplum of the style of doing history I try to tell about. And 
I mean for it to be a work of theological cultural criticism. I offer it as an 
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eschatological memory of one important piece of the lived reality of democracy 
in America. 
Telling: History, Ethics, and Eschatological Memories 
of Lived Religion 
We members of the Society of Christian Ethics seem to operate with a tacit 
agreement that there are some kinds of historical studies that are relevant for 
ethics, and some kinds of historical studies that are "just history." We know 
what belongs in an ethics journal and what belongs in a history journal. A study 
of clothing and the performance of gender in nineteenth-century revivals in 
Kentucky? That's history. But a study of Augustine's views on gender roles? 
That could be ethics, as long as there isn't too much "context." Catholic 
women's penitential practices in the urban South in the 1950s? History. Either 
Niebuhr on sin and forgiveness, from the same decade? Ethics. We know the 
difference. But how do we know? Oddly enough, when something happened is 
irrelevant for whether or not we count it as "just history." A study of Norman 
Vincent Peale 's beliefs about self-transformation is history, even if it happened 
just fifty years ago. But a study of Aquinas on virtue is clearly ethics, even if 
Aquinas wrote more than seven centuries ago. It isn't time that makes the past 
the past. So what is it? 
Ronald Green defined the latent standards for sorting history from ethics as 
well as anyone. Reflecting on the first twenty years of the Journal of Religious 
Ethics, Green argued that the Journal rightly limited the historical material it 
printed to "conceptually-oriented historical studies, including careful analyses 
of topics of abiding interest and the contributions of classical figures who con­
tinue to shape contemporary thinking."1 Green offered a perfect description of 
the prevailing norms for historical studies among ethicists: When we do history 
at all, we tend to tell histories of the ideas of canonical thinkers about topics that 
still concern us. 
When an ethicist writes about historical materials that satisfy these criteria, 
conventions of style and genre smooth the transitions between historical de­
scription and ethical prescription. The historical or literary present lets us write 
about certain kinds of history in the present—the same tense in which we write 
modern moral philosophy. But the convention of historical present extends 
only to certain kinds of historical materials. We might write, for instance, "For 
Jonathan Edwards, the nature of true virtue involves consent to being in gen­
eral." But we would never say, "When Edwards preaches, he looks at a point 
above the congregation's heads." Concepts are eternally present, but practices 
have a shelf life. So, too, we would not say, "People in Edwards' congregation 
in Northampton believe that the nature of true virtue involves consent to being 
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in general." Edwards believes, but the people in the pews believed. He's present, 
they're past. He's ethics, they're history. Conventions like the historical present 
close the gap between history and ethics. But they work best when a writer fol-
lows the criteria Green named: "conceptually oriented" work about "topics of 
abiding interest" as discussed in "classical figures who continue to shape con-
temporary thinking." 
I do not mean to undermine that kind of work. I believe it has been and will 
continue to be part of most of the very best work in our field. But I do want to 
challenge the power of these criteria to define the field. First, I want to question 
the exclusive emphasis on "conceptually oriented" studies. Why should ethi-
cists be interested only—or even primarily—in concepts? Second, I want to 
question the exclusive emphasis on figures and topics that have enduring influ-
ence. Why should the only interesting people and topics be the ones that man-
aged to leave a legacy? This emphasis on continuity leads ethicists to tell histo-
ries that make connections between past, present, and some time of fulfillment. 
And so we do most of our historical work in narrative, the genre of connection 
and continuity. But why should historical work in ethics be limited to narratives 
about the rise or fall of particular ideas? 
In this essay I try to expand the kinds of historical subjects that might be con-
sidered fit for ethics, and to expand the acceptable genres for relating historical 
facts to ethical norms and theological hopes. More specifically: I want to expand 
what we study to include lived religion, and the genres for relating past, present, 
and the time of hope to make room for the discontinuities of eschatological 
memory. 
Lived Religion 
A focus on "lived religion" would expand the scope of historical studies beyond 
texts that present the ideas of canonical authors. Robert Orsi defined "lived reli-
gion" in a way that made it much more than a gathering of the presumed oppo-
sites of text, idea, and canon. He advocated use of the phrase precisely because it 
avoided polarities of text vs. performance, ideal vs. material, and high versus 
popular culture. It included all of this, and more: manners, mores, ideas, institu-
tions, architecture, music, dress, sermons, posters, postures—all the dimensions 
of ethical life, and not just as "context," but as the very stuff of Sittlichkeit.2 
Ethicists of many stripes have good reasons to turn to lived religion. Scholars 
committed to democracy might assume that nonelites live ethical lives worth 
thinking about. Jeffrey Stout made a case for this in Democracy and Tradition, 
arguing that "The ethical inheritance of American democracy consists, first of 
all, in a way of thinking and talking about ethical topics that is implicit in the be-
havior of ordinary people. Second, it also consists in the activity of intellectuals 
who attempt to make sense ofthat way of thinking and talking from a reflective, 
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critical point of view." Stout's close readings of writers like Emerson and Baldwin 
gave us this second level, but left the first open for future studies.3 Like demo-
crats, religious ethicists who identify as liberationist also have reasons to turn to 
lived religion. Liberationists have a stake in expanding not only the canon of 
thinkers but also our sense of the modes of meaningful discourse. Scholars like 
Joan Martin and Dwight Hopkins have already taken this work up. Liberationists 
might find surprising common ground with more ecclesially focused ethicists 
around a turn to lived religion. Christian ethicists committed to the idea that the 
church is the body of Christ should be interested in every conceivable aspect of 
church life. Ecclesial ethicists should consider not only the doctrines of powerful 
figures and not only the rubrics that guide official performance, but also the prac-
tices and sensibilities of actual existing Christian people. A wide variety of com-
mitments, then, might lead us to consider lived religion in our work in ethics. 
All of us who work in ethics should feel compelled by the turn in the guild of 
historical studies not just to "social history," but also to histories of material cul-
ture, performance, dress, practice, space, sounds, and more. Histories of ideas 
still matter very much, but even their most fervent advocates would acknowl-
edge that they are only part of the story.4 A significant shift has occurred within 
the guild of historical studies. To suggest that ethicists should follow the lead of 
historians in turning to lived religion is not to collapse the distinction between 
historical studies and ethics. It is rather to recognize that distinction, and to re-
spect the specialized knowledge it makes possible, even as we respect the stan-
dards of the scientific guilds with which we engage. Ethicists might argue 
against that shift, but we cannot ignore it. It is at least the case that the burden 
of proof has shifted to those who count as relevant only those historical studies 
that consider the ideas of canonical figures. 
Eschatological Memories 
I want to propose an expansion not only of what counts as relevant history for 
ethicists, but also of the ways in which we work with whatever histories we have. 
There are many good proposals already in the mix. Jennifer Herdt traced the 
interrelationships between Richard Rorty's genres of Geistesgeschichte, historical 
reconstruction, and the rational reconstruction that remains dominant. Jean 
Porter argued rightly for a pedagogical use of historical studies. Melissa Snarr 
gave a compelling example of "intellectual history as discursive activism." All of 
these proposals have real merit, and I believe that all of them should be pursued. 
I simply want to add another genre—eschatological memory. In the paragraphs 
below I try to develop a sketch of that genre through contrast with Alasdair 
Maclntyre's notions of narrative and tradition.5 
Maclntyre has done as much as anyone to rekindle the interest of ethicists in 
history, and his own historical studies have been important. He organized the 
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most influential of those studies by two related devices—the narrative of decline 
that provided the spine of After Virtue, and the concept of tradition that pro-
vided the structure and substance of Whose Justice? Which Rationality? The nar-
rative of After Virtue was, Maclntyre wrote, "what Hegel called philosophical 
history." Told from the vantage point of a normatively charged end, it brought 
a disparate mass of data into a moral order. Maclntyre scoffed at the idea of an 
"evaluatively neutral chronicle," and told instead a narrative of "decline and 
fall." The narrative related the historical past not only to the present, but also to 
a norm: the story drove toward the present as a time of ruins.6 
Maclntyre's concept of tradition, hinted at m After Virtue but developed more 
fully in Whose Justice?, followed the same template of an Hegelian philosophical 
history. This time, though, the narrative was progressive. "A tradition," Macln-
tyre famously wrote, "is an argument extended through time " And for Mac-
lntyre a tradition extended through time in a very particular way. A well-ordered 
tradition proceeded as people initially submitted to established standards, found 
problems that the keepers of those standards would recognize as problems, and 
then offered solutions that the masters of the guild would recognize as solutions. 
A tradition therefore connected past and present—and fact and norm—through 
the social, historical process of justification. That process made possible refine-
ments of commitments and resolutions of debates. As Maclntyre wrote again and 
again, the problem with "modern" patterns of justification was that they ended in 
interminable debate. They never went anywhere, except by violence or seduc-
tion. A tradition, on the other hand, could make progress.7 
The narrative of decline and the tradition of progress were two sides of the 
same coin. Both followed Hegel in linking together past, present, and norm. 
Maclntyre's narrative and tradition differed in important ways from Hegel's 
philosophical history. Maclntyre did not presume to tell his philosophical histo-
ries from the end of history, as Hegel did. Whose Justice?, in particular, located its 
author at a position that claimed to be nothing more (but nothing less) than the 
best position so far. The end from which he told the story of justification stood 
open to further revision in a way that Hegel's did not. Whose Justice? also differed 
from Hegel in acknowledging the presence and persistence—for now—of mul-
tiple, contending traditions. Provisional and plural, Maclntyre's traditions es-
caped some of the vices of Hegel's philosophical history. 
But Maclntyre's sense of narrative and tradition retained Hegel's deep em-
pathy with the victors of history.8 Knowledge began, in tradition-constituted 
inquiry, with submission to the prevailing standards. More than this, the "los-
ers" of the struggles over justification that constituted a tradition faced two 
choices: assimilation or expulsion. Either they submitted to the triumphant 
point of view and made it their own, or they left the tradition and became irra-
tional (or, at best, differently rational and so incomprehensible). One way or an-
other, the tradition's narrative of progress made them disappear. 
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Again, many different sets of commitments might give ethicists reasons to 
reject this narrative form. Feminists, womanists, and other scholars committed 
to hearing voices that have not prevailed historically should be troubled by tra-
dition's power to make the losers disappear. So should democrats who sniff out 
the totalitarian tendencies. And so should Christians committed to a theology 
of the cross in which the resurrection of Jesus does not "justify" his crucifixion, 
does not sweep the breaking of the Word made flesh into a triumphal narrative 
of redemption in which the cross dissolves into a happy ending. Christians 
committed to repetitions of the liturgies for both Good Friday and Easter 
Sunday have reasons to reject a narrative of progress in favor of a genre that can 
hold tragedy and redemption together. 
Jeffrey Stout's Democracy and Tradition did not reject Maclntyre's definition 
of tradition, but rather refunctioned it in at least three ways. First, Stout insisted 
on a distinction between justification and truth that accentuated the provisional 
quality of Maclntyre's work and moved Stout still further from any claims to be 
writing from The End of The Story. Second, Stout defined a tradition simply as 
"an enduring discursive practice." He refused to require the kind of internal 
structure that turned Maclntyre's traditions into narratives of progress. The 
model of discursive redemption that Stout borrowed from Robert Brandom 
should produce vignettes of localized problem solving, not epic narratives of 
progress. Finally, the form of the book fit Stout's sense of tradition. He did not 
arrange his studies of Emerson, Dewey, Baldwin, and Ellison into a narrative of 
development. He demonstrated continuity over time, but he did not tell a story 
of progress. As such, the differences between the figures could endure, and the 
studies could invite rather than suppress supplementation.9 With these three 
shifts Stout developed a sense of tradition that did not commit him to the kind 
of progress Maclntyre assumed. 
Seeing the ways Stout transformed Maclntyre's understanding of tradition 
raises the question of why he used language of tradition at all. What is gained by 
calling an "enduring discursive practice" a "tradition"? The language served 
Stout well in Democracy and Tradition, for it helped him to argue against advo-
cates of tradition and advocates of democracy who saw one other as anathema. 
But I would suggest that the rest of Stout's argument could proceed with some-
thing like Brandon's notion of enduring discursive practice and without the 
kind of progress implied in Maclntyre's notion of tradition. At the very least, we 
might conclude that there remains room for genres other than tradition in 
which religious ethicists might take up history. 
The genre I call eschatological memory begins in remembering that which a 
dominant narrative of progress suppresses in order to make sense. It remembers 
the loser of the contest for justification, the stray detail that does not fit the 
moral of the story, the stage devoured in Aufhebung, the person who must be 
banished for community to be established, the positively hieroglyphic passages 
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of Walter Benjamin that must be ignored in order to use his thought for a jour­
nal article. In Benjamin's phrase, eschatological memory "brushes history 
against the grain."10 It begins by exhuming a body that has been properly buried. 
Such exhumation unleashes at least three processes. First, it unleashes a pro­
cess of mortification. In finding a moment that had been superseded in a narra­
tive of progress and remembering that moment for its own sake, eschatological 
memory "blasts" it from that narrative. That blasting shatters the narrative— 
and calls into question the end toward which it runs and the meaningfulness of 
the suffering that it claims to justify.11 Thus Benjamin could write that, "Criti­
cism means the mortification of the works . . . not then—as the romantics have 
it—awakening of the consciousness in living works, but the settlement of 
knowledge of dead ones."12 
The exhumed body creates a kind of imperative: never again. And so it calls 
for a second process, a politics of piecemeal repair. The remembered body de­
mands actions that prevent its reassimilation to the narrative that justified its 
death. It also demands actions that resist the narrative's desire to reestablish 
closure, to regain legitimacy, by making other corpses. The memory of suffer­
ing as suffering, unredeemed by narrative, sparks political action. As Benjamin 
wrote in his "Theses on the Philosophy of History," revolutionary action is 
"nourished by the image of enslaved ancestors better than that of liberated 
grandchildren. "λ 3 
While Benjamin saw the implications of past fact for present action, he re­
fused the temptation to smudge away the cleft that separated present from the 
past. He resisted the commemorations that swept across Europe in the wake of 
World War I, the ceremonies that sought to "save" the dead by spinning narra­
tives that gave meaning to their suffering (narratives not unlike the ones we 
hear now, from a president who argues that we should stay the course in Iraq to 
win a victory that will make the loss of life so far something other than a catas­
trophe). Against such mythological narratives—for that is what attempts to re­
peat history become—Benjamin insisted that the dead were dead. Past suffering 
remained past, and neither Hegelian history nor Maclntyrean narrative could 
undo the catastrophe of that suffering. Even a successful politics of "never 
again" could not achieve the ends of "never happened" or "never mind." Re­
demption was not the work of human hands. Ours should rather be a politics of 
piecemeal repair.14 
The body exhumed by criticism and left unburied by politics became for 
Benjamin something like a negative icon of hope, a prayer for redemption be­
yond anything continuous with past suffering and present politics. It therefore 
touched offa third process, a movement of eschatological hope. Benjamin saw a 
world in travail, a world like the one in which Abel's blood cried from the 
ground (Gen. 4:10), in which all creation groaned with the labor pains of new 
creation (Rom. 8:22). That travail gave the content of hope. The content of 
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hope emerged through what Benjamin's friend Theodor Adorno called "deter-
minate negation." The exhumed body taught us what to hope for: the healing of 
its particular wounds. But it did not give grounds for hope. Benjamin struggled 
all his life with various ways to describe the grounds of his hope, if any. He tried 
on Romantic theories of language, Kabbalah, a mystical Marxism, and more.15 
It is not at all clear that any of these "worked." But searching for grounds of 
hope, for justification in the epistemic sense, may be a false trail in understand-
ing Benjamin. The body did not give grounds for hope, but it did give an im-
perative for hope. It made impossible a life of giving up, giving in, and getting 
with the program. Thus the "justification" for Benjamin's hope was not so 
much epistemological as ethical. That made it no less powerful. It let him write 
that "History is the subject of a structure whose site is not homogenous, empty 
time, but time filled with the presence of the Now \Jetztzeit]."16 Eschatological 
memories that have learned from Benjamin therefore refuse to see history as 
one damn thing after another. They refuse to see even a world of ruins as God-
forsaken. As the exhumed body demands a politics of piecemeal repair, it also 
demands an eschatological hope. 
The hope of eschatological memory refuses the consolations of teleology. 
Past suffering and ultimate hope are not linked by a smooth, continuous narra-
tive that moves, however dialectically, toward redemption. Rather, in Benja-
min's phrase, "every second of time was the straight gate through which the 
Messiah might enter."17 The hope of eschatological memory takes the form not 
of narrative, but of constellation, a relationship between distinct moments of 
past, present, and the now-time of the Eschaton. Such a constellation does not 
assimilate past suffering to itself. It does not make any moment disappear. It 
rather preserves the otherness—the bodiliness—of the body, even in redemp-
tion. And so it promises not a spiritual reconciliation of all in all, but a resurrec-
tion of the body. 
Showing: Horace Norton and Coeducation at Oberlin 
In the following section I hope to tell a short exemplum, a sermon story that 
shows what I mean by an eschatological memory of lived religion and begins to 
suggest the value of the genre. I also hope to contribute to debates about de-
mocracy in the United States, by remembering a broken promise of universal 
equality and tracing the politics and hope that flow from it. 
Formal Equality and Middle-Class Respectability 
In the wilds of Ohio in 1833 a group of evangelicals used money from revived 
sisters and brothers in New York and New England to found the Oberlin Col-
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legiate Institute. The new college pushed the bounds of equality further than 
any U.S. institution had before. It accepted as students both men and women, 
both whites and African Americans. Other colleges had already been founded to 
educate each of these groups separately but Oberlin was the first in the United 
States to try to educate them together. Here black and white women and men 
shared classrooms, libraries, and other public spaces. Oberlin was founded and 
led by revival leaders such as Charles Grandison Finney, and they built it on the 
kind of equality that lived at the heart of the revival gospel. In place of Old 
School Calvinism's belief that some were elected and some were not, the reviv-
alists preached that "whosoever will" could be saved. God was no respecter of 
persons, they preached. There were no distinctions. All had sinned and fallen 
short of the glory of God. And God offered salvation in Jesus Christ—and edu-
cation at Oberlin—to all without distinction. One way to tell the story of 
Oberlin, then, would be to see it as an important stage in the development of a 
tradition of equality. Historian Nancy Hardesty frames it in just this way.18 
But placing Oberlin within a narrative about progress toward equality for-
gets all that women gave up in order to be there. Compared with other colleges, 
Oberlin looked like a radically egalitarian experiment. But Oberlin was heir not 
only to traditions in American higher education, but also to traditions of revival 
that extended back to the camp meetings of the last years of the 18th century. 
Women and girls exhorted the crowds at every early camp meeting in Kentucky, 
and continued to do so as the practice spread north into New York. Women also 
led and addressed more permanent gatherings: communities formed around 
Mother Ann Lee at Sodus Bay and New Lebanon, New York; Jemima Wilkin-
son, the Universal Friend, led communities first at Dresden, on Seneca Lake, 
and then at Jerusalem, on Keuka Lake. Women also spoke in public meetings of 
more established denominations in the region. Antoinette Brown, for instance, 
had been preaching and testifying in and out of churches since she was nine years 
old. Only when she went to Oberlin did she lose the chance to speak in public 
places to mixed assemblies of men and women.19 
Oberlin's curious combination of rights and restrictions for women fit closely 
with emerging canons of middle-class respectability. Respectable women acted 
in carefully limited ways in official public spaces like the main assembly hall of a 
church, a theatre, or an association of mechanics. New patterns of open and 
egalitarian seating stressed the equality of women as listeners in public places 
like classrooms and churches. But the norms of respectability did not extend that 
equality to speaking. Respectable women kept silent in official public spaces. 
They had much greater latitude, however, in alternative, seemingly "private" 
public spaces, including homes or small group meetings, especially if only 
women were present. Gendered norms shaped not only the spaces but also the 
styles of respectable practices. Respectable women were encouraged to cultivate 
their natural gifts for empathy, benevolence, and refined feelings. Prayer and 
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personal testimony drew upon those gifts in a way that preaching and public ora­
tory did not. Nothing could be more respectable than encouraging women to 
pray and "speak from the heart" to other women in places that were not marked 
as official public spaces. And women at Oberlin were encouraged in this kind of 
speech, and in full equality as listeners, even as they were prevented from speak­
ing in public. Oberlin's curious combination of equality and inequality fit closely 
with the emerging ideals of respectability.20 
Nathan Hatch and other historians have read evidence like this and tried to 
frame Finney—and so Oberlin—as a "transitional" moment in which Chris­
tianity in the United States traded its birthright of radical equality for a mess of 
the potage of respectability.21 But the shift from transgressive public speaking 
by women exhorters to equal status for women as members of an official public 
audience cannot be told as the simple story of a decline from equality to re­
spectability. Oberlin did not give up on equality to attain respectability. It 
promised a new kind of equality that depended on and made possible this new 
kind of respectability. 
Equality did not disappear, but changed. Coeducation at Oberlin offered a 
kind of equality not available to female exhorters who had to legitimate their 
speech through a claim to possession by the Holy Spirit. At Oberlin women 
could claim equality simply as members of the general class of humanity. 
"Women's rights," Oberlin graduate Theodore Weld argued in a reflection of 
the prevailing view at the school, could be derived from the broader category of 
"human rights." And unlike claims to inspiration at a camp meeting, the claims 
to equality based on membership in the broader category of humanity did not 
require proof at Oberlin—such membership, like the offer of salvation in gen­
eral atonement, was axiomatic. And the equality Oberlin offered its women stu­
dents did not come and go, like immediate inspiration, but endured as a rule of 
the community. A different kind of equality, limited in some ways but expanded 
in others, found incarnation in the practice of coeducation at Oberlin. If women 
gave up the transgressive equality of ecstatic exhortation, the equality that came 
with crossing boundaries, they gained a new formal equality that guaranteed 
them certain human rights.22 
Hatch's narrative of decline missed the real gains of formal equality. In sug­
gesting a trade-off between equality and respectability, it also missed the deep 
alliance of formal equality and middle-class respectability. Respectability helped 
to define and legitimate formal equality, even as formal equality itself became a 
marker of respectability. The fashionably respectable churches of New York 
City featured equal seating of men and women. And families aspiring to respect­
ability sought a formally equal education for their daughters. An emerging mid­
dle class did not trade equality for respectability, but harmonized the two in a 
powerful new combination. That harmony of equality and respectability, which 
has come to seem as natural as a parlor song, was not easy at first. Remembering 
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a moment of dissonance early in its development can help us understand an im-
portant form of equality as it actually exists in the United States today—and be-
gin to imagine a better hope. 
Exhuming the Body 
In May 1840, a scandal broke out at Oberlin and revealed the fragility—and the 
importance—of the fusion of formal equality and middle-class respectability. 
Horace Norton, a young white student from Ripley, Ohio, sent sexually explicit 
notes to at least four students in the female department: Sarah A. Bidwell, Mary 
L. Ingalls, Jane D. L. Isham, and a Miss Owen. Norton had been a writing mas-
ter before coming to Oberlin, and he used his skills with the pen to illustrate ex-
actly what he had in mind. He seems to have signed at least some of them 
"Junius," perhaps evoking Junius Brutus Booth, the British actor who ruled the 
affections of the pit with his robust, athletic style. At least one of the young 
women turned the letters over to Alice Welch Cowles, the principal of the fe-
male department. She in turn gave them to her husband, Professor Henry 
Cowles, who shared them with Timothy B. Hudson, professor of Latin and 
Greek, and H. C. Taylor, a student in the theological school who acted as post-
master. The letters, complete with vile "pictorial efforts," seem to have made 
still wider rounds among men and women, faculty and students. A quorum 
emerged who believed that something had to be done.23 
Someone—maybe H. C. Taylor, and maybe, as would later be charged, one 
of the young women—wrote back to Norton in a feminine hand to arrange a 
tryst. Full of anticipation, the would-be Junius dragged his bedding from his 
boarding house to spread it under a tree out of sight of the village and the road. 
It was Saturday night, about ten o'clock. A young woman student—probably 
Maria B. Babbitt—met Norton at the appointed time and place and walked 
with him into the woods. Just before they reached the bedding, a group of male 
faculty and students ambushed Norton. In his official testimony, H. C. Taylor 
described an orderly process of "arrest" and "examination" in which the exam-
iners took the judicious precaution of blindfolding and briefly covering the 
mouth of the arraigned. Norton's father described a more vicious attack in 
which some twenty men jumped Norton from all sides, choked him, and then 
stuffed the "end of a large stick" into his mouth, breaking his teeth. They then 
shoved a stone wrapped in a handkerchief into his mouth, so that he could not 
speak and could barely breathe. "A rope was then applied to each extremity," 
Norton's father reported, and 
his hands bound behind so tightly that the circulation of the blood was in a 
great measure suspended in them, he was then dragged with violence to a 
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barn on the opposite side of the way from Taylor's house, strung up with his 
back to a post, with his feet just touching the floor, a posture almost as painful 
as that of being suspended upon the cross. 
Norton hung while his captors examined him and deliberated among them-
selves, his father said. The Oberlin men prayed and wept as they sought the will 
of God. They finally heard the call to give Norton twenty-five lashes with a 
cowhide whip. E. H. Fairchild, a tutor in the college and brother to James H. 
Fairchild, who would succeed Finney as president, did the whipping. While "it 
is not pretended that the whipping was not a severe one," Taylor testified, it did 
not break the skin at any point. Norton's father again described the event dif-
ferently. Using the language of his medical profession, he charged that the 
blows cut "down to the cellular substance" of his son's back. And using the lan-
guage of a skilled pamphleteer, he charged that his son's back "was literally cut 
up. The blood oozed through his clothing." Somehow Horace Norton stag-
gered to Wellington, nine miles away.24 
Attempts to keep the whole incident quiet failed, and by the fall of 1840 the 
college had to take some official action. The faculty debated for almost a month 
before issuing a complex set of resolutions. They denounced (by a narrow mar-
gin) any attempt by private individuals to inflict corporal punishment, no mat-
ter how just the cause. The "chastisement" of Norton, then, was unjustifiable. 
But the faculty voted to commend the actions that had led to Norton's "detec-
tion." And while the chastisement was wrong, it was an act that at least intended 
justice and not mere private revenge. It therefore stood on a different moral 
plane than the "deliberate and flagrant wickedness" of Norton. On October 8, 
1840, the faculty declared the case closed. Four men had confessed to the 
church at Oberlin that they had participated in the lynching, and no further 
confessions would be solicited. None of the men would be expelled from the 
student body or fired from the faculty.25 
Word of what came to be called "the lynching at Oberlin" spread quickly, 
and it outraged multiple publics for multiple reasons. The courts of Ohio did 
not tolerate the breach of law and order, and Norton won both criminal and 
civil trials. People already opposed to Oberlin found new grounds for their be-
lief that the place was a hive of fanaticism that had to be shut down. Norton's fa-
ther described how "Hundreds of men, from various parts of the country, were 
with difficulty restrained from proceeding to Oberlin for the purpose of de-
stroying the place." Three hundred people from neighboring Elyria gathered 
together and threatened to burn the college to the ground. Opposition also 
spread to people otherwise supportive of Oberlin and the broader new mea-
sures cause. Revived parents sent for their children. The Presbytery of the Hu-
ron launched an investigation. New measures evangelicals across the country 
worried not only about the violence of the whipping but also about charges that 
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the vigilantes had lied to entrap the scoundrel and then initiated a whipping 
that extended into the Sabbath.26 
Charges of Sabbath-breaking and lying paled in comparison to charges of 
indecent behavior by the women of the college. Greenleaf Norton, Horace's fa-
ther, described Oberlin as a "labyrinth of coquettes," and questioned the re-
spectability of the "venerable MATRONS" and the "vestal maidens . . . chaste 
as the icicle, that curdled by the front from purest snow, and hang on Dian's 
temple." If young Norton's notes were so foul, why did these "Ladies (?) of the 
institute" read, study, and circulate them? Why did they not burn them? Did 
they perhaps enjoy them? Did they not help solicit them? Did they not gather 
with men for "nocturnal meetings" at which they read the letters and plotted 
what they might do to a young man's body? The notes and the lynching simply 
revealed the lewd mixing already taking place at Oberlin.27 
Oberlin loyalists defended the school on every count but took special pains 
to defend the respectability of the women and so the college. Writing for a spe-
cial edition of the Oberlin Evangelist in 1841, Professor Taylor said that "the 
lady" had been used only to identify, "not to decoy," the notewriter. "She was 
not out of the reach of efficient protection for a single moment, and was con-
ducted home immediately after his arrest. She knew nothing of any intended 
punishment." Professor Cowles argued that young Norton had not even met 
the women to whom he addressed the letters, but had picked their names from 
the school directory. "I mention these circumstances," he wrote, "partly to 
show how little the fact that young gentlemen and ladies attend this school to-
gether has to do with these outrages upon all virtue and decency." Professor 
John Morgan summed up the college's official position: "The Female Depart-
ment has excited great apprehensions; but during the seven years that have 
passed since the Institution was founded, not only have its members been pre-
served from vice, but from serious indiscretion."28 
The Oberlin men also defended their own respectability. They refuted all 
charges of Sabbath-breaking and lying and argued that the monstrous nature of 
the crime would elicit such a response from any decent man. In speaking 
around the letters they adopted a rhetoric of decency in their argumentation, 
refusing to sully themselves by quoting or even speaking specifically about their 
content. Greenleaf Norton had repeatedly demanded that the letters be made 
public so that all could judge the actions of the mob. "Decency forbids that the 
letters be published," Cowles wrote in reply, even to satisfy the demands of jus-
tice. Instead the Oberlin men rendered the letters unspeakable, able to be de-
scribed only by the reactions they elicited. "Their vileness passes all descrip-
tion," Morgan wrote, "and has literally astounded every one who has seen 
them." Cowles remembered people saying, "'How unutterably vile'—'beyond 
anything I could ever have conceived of.' 'No wonder those young men flogged 
him'—'there is scarcely another community in the land where such a fellow 
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could have escaped with his life.'" Such indirect description suggested a gulf be­
tween the Christian gentlemen of Oberlin and satyr-like "Junius." They could 
not even speak of what he had done. In both the form and the substance of their 
arguments, then, Oberlin loyalists framed the flogging not as a revelation of in­
decency but as a respectable community dealing out what one writer called a 
"lesson in manners." 2 9 
T h e arguments after the lynching help clarify just what was at stake in the 
lynching itself. More than the character of any individual man or woman, Hor­
ace Norton's notes called into question the respectability of Oberlin's style of 
equality. White and black women and men mixed freely in the public spaces of 
classrooms, the church, and the dining hall. Such mixing retained respectability 
because it involved the transcendence, rather than the transgression, of differ­
ences. In these spaces, at least, women and men met one another as identical, 
common members of the more general set of human beings. Norton's notes vi­
olated that ideal. H e acted as if gender distinctions had been transgressed, not 
transcended. Oberlin strained toward a new merger of respectability and equal­
ity, and Norton threatened the whole project. T h e depth of this threat begins to 
make sense of the ferocity of the lynching and of the language used after the at­
tack to describe him. Many writers used language like that of Professor Cowles: 
" T h e occurrence developed to our view the appalling fact, that in the bosom of 
our peaceful community there lurked somewhere a monster of obscenity and 
depravity." Norton became a demon who had to be exorcised so that the fragile 
union of equality and respectability cobbled together at Oberlin could sur­
vive.30 
Oberlin's defenders worked hard to turn the lynching from an embarrassment 
into an icon of the college's respectability. Over time those efforts began to have 
success. While most of the college community condemned the deed, they came 
to celebrate the men who did it. Others celebrated the virtuous men of Oberlin as 
well. J. H. Fairchild wrote that the men from the mob "frequently receive letters 
from ladies in New England & other parts of the country thanking them for the 
deed,—And some parents have sent their daughters to Ofberlin] for education 
who hesitated to do it before " 3 1 Finney's view matched Fairchild's, and his fi­
nal assessment of the incident is worth quoting at length: 
But what effect had the trial of the young men? And especially how did the 
outrageous comments and denunciations of the press, far and near have upon 
our school? Did it keep the young ladies and gentlemen from coming here to 
school? No indeed! It was found that it had produced an entirely opposite ef­
fect. It was found that people reasoned thus. They had been afraid, and much 
pains had been taken to make them afraid, of trusting their daughters in a 
school where young ladies and gentlemen recited in the same class, ate in the 
same boarding hall, and were in all respects associated as they were here. It 
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was of course regarded as an experiment, and by many as an experiment of a 
very questionable nature. But the result of all this bluster and opposition, es-
pecially in relation to this prosecution and the cause of it, was that people rea-
soned in this way: Well, if there is such a public sentiment as this at Oberlin, if 
an attempt to seduce one of those young ladies brings upon the offender that 
kind of retribution, there is the very place for our daughters. We can send 
them there with more safety than anywhere else. If the young men ofthat col-
lege will themselves give a young man such a thorough castigation who at-
tempts any such thing, such a public sentiment must be favorable to chastity, 
and to the protection of our daughters when away from home. There was 
therefore a continual increase of our students, and especially of females; and 
the relative number of ladies in our college seemed to increase from year to 
year.32 
In Finney's view the lynching secured the respectability and so the success of 
coeducation. Enrollment numbers backup Finney's interpretation. In 1840, the 
year of the lynching, 166 of 484 Oberlin students were women (26.4 percent). 
By 1851 the number of women students had grown to 241 of 571 (34.3 per-
cent). The growth continued the next year, when an endowment made possible 
scholarships that almost doubled total enrollment, and then reached artificial 
highs during the Civil War. By the time of Finney's recollections, in the 1870s, 
the percentage of women students at Oberlin had reached a solid 43.6 percent. 
Parents did feel more comfortable sending their daughters to Oberlin after the 
lynching, in part because it proved the virtues of Oberlin's combination of 
equality and respectability. "Indeed," Finney said, "in the providence of God al-
most all the onsets that were made against us through the press, by other meth-
ods of attack, resulted in our favor."33 
Mortification, Politics and Hope 
Once Oberlin's fusion of equality and respectability was secured, it seemed best 
to forget Horace Norton. Someone—probably J. H. Fairchild, Finney's succes-
sor as president and the editor of his Memoirs—literally cut the pages describing 
the Oberlin lynching out of the manuscript of his recollections. The pages re-
mained hidden for almost a century in another part of the Oberlin archives. 
Whoever did the cutting knew that the whipped body of Horace Norton is a 
memory that must be suppressed for the survival of Oberlin's amalgamation of 
formal equality and middle-class respectability. 
In remembering Norton I do not mean to defend his actions, nor the ways 
they made Oberlin an even more difficult place for women students. I do mean 
to use his actions to expose some of the dynamics around equality and respect-
ability at Oberlin—dynamics that included restricting women in the name of the 
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very respectability that Norton violated. And in remembering the white body of 
Norton I do not mean to forget that the vast majority of people who have been 
lynched in the United States have been African American. Race mattered very 
much in Norton's case. The mixing of black and white students made Oberlin's 
respectability very fragile. And if Norton had been anything but white, the mob 
almost certainly would have killed him. I remember Norton not to hide the im-
portance of race, but to expose some of the ways racialized power has legitimated 
itself—even under the guise of equality. I exhume Norton's body to ignite the 
three processes I have tried to gather together as eschatological memory: morti-
fication, a politics of piecemeal repair, and a hope beyond hope. 
Remembering Horace Norton not only reveals the depth of the alliance be-
tween formal equality and middle-class respectability, but also mortifies each of 
the ideals. Memories of Norton break open Oberlin's promise to offer a formal 
equality that extended to all people. They reveal the deep alliance of for-
mal equality, as it actually existed, with respectability. And so they reveal formal 
equality's role as a marker of class and a resource for legitimating inequality. 
The moral worth attached to formal equality transferred to the managers and 
merchants who promoted it. It helped to make them not only more powerful 
than, but also more legitimate than other classes. (The persistence of this dy-
namic begins to suggest why wealthy urbanités vote against their short-term 
economic interests to support the ideals of formal equality, and one reason why 
working-class people have been more resistant to the particular kind of liberal-
ism centered on formal equality. It also begins to explain why seemingly pro-
gressive churches have had so much difficulty attracting the dispossessed people 
to whom they offer formal equality.) Consciousness of this mortification is at 
least as old as Marx. But it is worth remembering again: The promise of formal 
equality is not just a step along the way to perfect equality, but also a source of 
legitimation for inequality.34 Memories of Norton mortify Oberlin's promise 
not only of equality, but also of respectability. The respectability of Oberlin 
could not coexist with memories of the whipped and beaten body of Horace 
Norton. Coeducation secured by a lynching, even one undertaken with prayer 
and before the beginning of the Sabbath, could hardly be respectable.35 When 
Horace Norton is remembered, the respectability promised by Oberlin's for-
mal equality looks like little more than mob violence that has won the day, 
washed its hands, and dressed for church. 
Memories of Norton enable better conversations about equality in the 
United States. They help us make distinctions, as between formal and trans-
gressive equality, and they force us to deal with equality not merely as an ab-
stract ideal but also as a social fact, a part of the lived religion of American 
democracy. They make visible the deep alliance in the United States between 
formal equality and middle-class respectability. And so they enable a better pol-
itics. Memories of Norton prevent a politics that seeks to extend a "tradition" of 
formal equality in a narrative of progress. Formal equality was insufficiently re-
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alized at Oberlin—women still could not preach—but even a perfect realization 
of the ideals of formal equality would not resolve the deep antinomy Norton re-
veals. It would only heighten the power of formal equality to legitimate class 
difference. Middle-class respectability and formal equality may be separable in 
principle, but as they actually exist in the United States they will be separated 
only by wily and deliberate political action. 
A politics that remembered Horace Norton would neither work to perfect 
formal equality nor lose itself in the tactics of transgressive equality, the other 
which formal equality sought to subsume and replace. It would rather hold 
open the two poles of this would-be historical dialectic, and draw from both of 
them for the sake of piecemeal political action. Such a politics might include 
black men and women taking their rightful places . . . and then speaking "out of 
turn." It might involve white women acting in ways that compromised the re-
spectability of the community . . . in order to secure more formal equality. On 
today's political frontier it might look like an unresolved dialectic between 
ActUp and the Human Rights Campaign. It might take the form of a shame-
lessly sexy street dance to protest workplace discrimination. A politics that re-
membered Norton would not just combine formal and transgressive equalities 
within itself. It would also build alliances with those on the losing end of formal 
equality's power to legitimate. 
Even such a boisterous politics, though, would not redeem the body of Hor-
ace Norton. Unburied, Norton's body prays for an equality that transcends the 
respectability of a now-eroding middle class. There is a sense in which that escha-
tological equality is present even now, in the deep equality of every ideology, 
class, person, and promise of respectability. All have sinned and fallen short of the 
glory of God, just as Finney preached. There is another sense, though, in which 
Norton's body prays for a new community that is present now only in hope. The 
content ofthat hope flows from what it would take to heal his particular wounds: 
a truly universal community of equality that did not depend on a boundary with-
out and the annihilation of difference—and the erotics that difference makes 
possible—within. John Rawls gave a tentative glimpse of such a community in his 
call for civic friendship. Walt Whitman gave a much stronger taste in his evoca-
tions of democratic desire.36 Unburied and unforgotten, Norton's body prays for 
a community that knows neither Jew nor Greek, male nor female, slave nor 
free—and yet sustains the differences that give love meaning and depth, even joy. 
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